1	UNREDACTED
2	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION
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5	JESSICA JONES, MICHELLE) VELOTTA, and CHRISTINA
6	LORENZEN on behalf of Themselves and All others
7	Similarly Situated,
8	VS)NO.2:20-CV-02892)JACKSON, TENNESSEE
9	VARSITY BRANDS, LLC;)
0	VARSITY SPIRIT, LLC; VARSITY FASHIONS & SUPPLIES, LLC;
1	U.S. ALL STAR FEDERATION, INC,;JEFF WEBB;
2	CHARLESBANK CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC; and BAIN
3	CAPITAL PRIVATE EQUITY;
4	
5	EXPEDITED TRANSCRIPTION
6	VIA FTR RECORDING
7	NOVEMBER 19, 2021
8	
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE TU PHAM,
0	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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2	KRISTI HEASLEY, RPR
:3	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER U.S. COURTHOUSE, SUITE 450
24	111 SOUTH HIGHLAND AVENUE JACKSON, TENNESSEE 38301
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	UNREDACTED TRANSCRIPT

2 1 **APPEARANCES** 2 FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: 3 AHSLEA SCHWARZ, ESQ. PAUL LLP 4 601 Walnut Street, Suite 300 Kansas City, KS 64106 5 6 KATHERINE MALONE, ESQ. HARTLEY LLP 7 101 West Broadway, Suite 820 San Diego, CA 92101 8 9 10 11 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 12 STEVEN KAISER, ESQ. CLEARY GOTTILEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP 13 2112 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20037 14 15 MATTHEW MULQUEEN, ESQ. NICOLE D. BERKOWITZ, ESQ. 16 BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ 165 Madison Avenue, Suite 2000 17 Memphis, TN 38103 18 19 BRENDAN PATRICK GAFFNEY, ESQ. LOCKE LORD LLP 20 2200 Ross Avenue, Suite 2800 Dallas, TX 75201 21 22 EDWARD L. STANTON, III, ESQ. BUTLER SNOW LLP 23 6075 Poplar Avenue, Suite 500 Memphis, TN 38119 24 25 UNREDACTED TRANSCRIPT

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for -- example, Nico Banks from my office. Although, he has not actually entering an appearance, he is on the call.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. I assume there is -- I have my staff also on the call here as well.

Okay. Then unless anyone else has to chime in -
MR. SUTTER: Your Honor, good afternoon.

This Mark Sutter from Burger Montague on behalf of the Fusion Elite All Star plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, let's

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, let's go ahead and get started.

So I got that email yesterday regarding some of the issues here raised that we're going to address with Varsity. And it sounded like in the email that those parties were able to resolve all their disputes, which is great. But I think in that email y'all had asked to be excused from participating, at least as it relates to those issues.

And I did want to just quickly touch upon that motion and those issues to see if there is anything that the Court needed to do.

I don't know if the parties anticipated, anticipated submitting a proposed order resolving, or

whether the motion was being withdrawn as to those parties. I just wasn't clear on that. So I wanted to hear from you all on that.

And then whoever is on that matter, if you want to disconnect from the call then you can.

MR. KAISER: Our understanding, Your Honor, is that we resolved these by agreement, and that no further action by the Court is needed. I guess for a housekeeping measure, that would mean technically the motion is withdrawn. But, obviously, we are going to follow through on what we agreed to do.

MS. MALONE: Yeah. Just to follow up. We would be happy to submit a proposed order reflecting the terms that we came to.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm glad I raised that, because two different things there. Right? If there is a -- I hope there was a meeting of the minds and I disrupt things here.

But on the one hand, if there is a motion that the parties have resolved and want the terms of that agreement memorialized in a court order with the authority of the Court to impose any sanctions, I suppose, I'm not inviting that. But to have the force of any order, that's one thing.

If it's that you're withdrawing the motion

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in light of this agreement, and then there is nothing for the Court to resolve or enter, that could be something very, very different.

MR. KAISER: Your Honor, we spent weeks and months negotiating this. Certainly, having a court order at the end of it was not a part of that negotiation. I would say that if that is what the plaintiffs have in mind, they should have raised it a long time ago. Furthermore, it will only serve to complicate the issue.

We know what we're supposed to do. We're going to go off and do it. And I think really the right thing to happen here is the motion should just be denied as moot.

THE COURT: Ms. Malone.

MS. MALONE: Well, if defendants — you know, it's a (inaudible). I have no doubt that they will. I'm not really sure what the downside of a proposed order memorializing the terms of the agreement are, so that's our preference.

MR. KAISER: The downside is that multiple times in negotiations the defendant — the plaintiffs have changed their position after agreements were made. And I fear that if you give them another opportunity, they'll, once again, change their position. And then

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we'll be back before you arguing about what they agreed to versus what they submitted as a order. We'll be doing this for the next two months. I just think that is a terrible use of resources in a case that is already far too resource-intensive. I would object to that. I think the motion should just be denied as moot. That was the agreement as we understood it and we're ready to go. MS. MALONE: I mean, the agreement was memorialized in writing and it's fairly clear. I think it would be relatively easy to just copy and paste into a proposed order and do the reformatting. So, again, we disagree. And I think just as a housekeeping matter, it would be preferable to have it in writing. And then that would also address your concerns about any ambiguities or disputes that may arise in the future. MR. KAISER: That just --THE COURT: Hold on a second. When you say my concern, your concern, were you talking to Mr. Kaiser or the Court? MS. MALONE: Sorry. I was talking to Mr. Kaiser.

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Your Honor, I think actually it would

smooth this out. You know, we certainly don't want to bring unnecessary motions before you. That's part of why we came to this agreement. And so the benefits of memorializing this in a way that every one is clear on, I think outweigh whatever concerns the Varsity defendants have.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm glad we had this, because that was a question I had. I wasn't clear, based on that short email I received, what the parties' expectations were as far as the end product, the end result of that, whether it was just a private agreement resolved and the motion would be denied as moot, as being withdrawn by, as being withdrawn, or whether the parties anticipated having the Court enter an order memorializing the parties' agreement in an order, I suppose.

And I don't know whether — it doesn't matter to me whether it's phrased as a motion, as an order granting the motion or denying it, or rather just an order regarding, so no one wins or loses.

But I think that was my question, which I think has been answered. Which is, y'all have not agreed on how to ultimately resolve the motion insofar as an order versus withdrawing the motion.

MR. KAISER: Well --

MS. MALONE: It wasn't contemplated in our

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discussions in our agreements, but yeah.

MR. KAISER: Judge Pham, she submitted — Ms. Malone submitted something to the Court that says, that the plaintiffs and the Varsity defendants have successfully resolved the outstanding discovery disputes outlined in ECF No. 100, which is the motion we're talking about.

And then goes on to say, the parties would like to request the Court take this motion off calendar for the November 19, 2021 hearing.

So I don't know what better evidence there is than — what we did was resolve the outstanding discovery disputes and, therefore, the motion is moot.

Now, obviously, they're trying to get something here, which is some sort of order that they can then say we're in contempt of down the line. That is not what we agreed to. And I don't know that we have an agreement then.

It would be unfortunate for this to hang up on this issue. But Ms. Malone said, well, I can just cut and past what we already have. And then she said, but it would be good to have more clarity.

Well, those two thing are not consistent with one another. I believe we have clarity. There is no need to get, involve the Court in this at this point

because we resolved it.

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We gave up a lot of things that we would not have to avoid Court involvement. And now it seems like we're getting pushed into Court involvement, which is not appropriate.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't know — it sounds like this is not an issue that y'all have seen eye to eye on. And perhaps with further discussion between the two of you, there could be some agreement about the agreement insofar as how to resolve this motion and the form in which it should be resolved.

So rather than taking up all the parties' time on that, why don't you all just have an off line conversation, and then try to work it out. And if you can't, then I can have just those parties on a separate call next week to resolve it, if you all can't resolve the form in which the motion should be resolved. Okay?

Insofar as the term, the one issue that came up was the time frame, the relevant time period. And I was curious and interested to know — again, I assume I'm not asking either side to violate the agreement to disclose what it is y'all agreed to regarding time frame.

But I did have a question, though.

That seems to be a recurring theme in this case, so just wanted to raise that.

1 Go ahead, Ms. Malone. 2 MS. MALONE: Yes. So, yes, Your Honor, 3 we -- as to the time period, we agreed the January 1st, 4 2015, date to June 30th, 2020, because Judge Claxton had 5 told us it was the Court's position that plaintiffs were 6 capped at the front end there. And that was the Court's 7 position and believed as to what was appropriate. So we 8 took that guidance and used that as a benchmark. 9 THE COURT: So January 2015 to December 10 2020? 11 MR. KAISER: June 30th, 2020. 12 MS. MALONE: June 30th, 2020. Yes, Your 13 Honor. 14 Okay. All right. So I guess THE COURT: 15 the parties involved in that portion of the hearing today 16 can just talk to each other and see if you can agree what 17 the right approach should be. And then you can let me 18 know here, let's say, Monday by 5:00 o'clock whether you 19 have agreed to the form in which the case, that that 20 motion be resolved. 21 If you tell me it's not been resolved, 22 I'll go ahead and set this for a separate hearing. And 23 I'll invite everyone, but it's really just for those who 24 are involved in this particular motion that would be

asked to attend, to see if I can help you resolve that

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1 dispute. Okay? 2 Anything else on that motion, those 3 issues? 4 MS. MALONE: No, Your Honor, not from the 5 plaintiffs. Thank you. 6 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 7 those -- if there is any attorneys that's limited to 8 that -- whoever wants to remove themselves from the call, 9 they can. I'm not going keep you to this. 10 Let me move on quickly the to Webb 11 proposed orders here. I had gotten the dueling versions 12 from the parties after the hearing before Judge Claxton. 13 Some variation, but it appears that the one about 14 plaintiffs seeking documents for earlier time period 15 based upon a good cause showing is still an option, looks 16 like from the plaintiff's version. And the defense 17 doesn't have that. MR. KAISER: Yes, Your Honor. 18 19 So there is a bit of a THE COURT:

THE COURT: So there is a bit of a difference there. So I wanted to talk to the Webb parties on the different versions and which one I should be entering.

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MS. SCHWARZ: This is Ashlea Schwarz for the plaintiffs. I think that's spot on. The only issue we have is in the hearing, Judge Claxton did say that she

thought that was the appropriate time frame. But, of course, if there was discovery or some reason down the road to come back, that she would entertain additional argument, if we believed that a further time period is necessary.

So I think while we're in agreement on the time period, we would just like the order to reflect that we do have that right from the prior ruling to come back, should the need arise.

THE COURT: Any response?

MR. GAFFNEY: Yes, Your Honor. I think as for Defendant Webb, Judge Claxton was quite clear on the time frame going from January 1st, 2015, to December of 2021.

The additional language that plaintiffs propose we find to be unnecessarily superfluous. While Judge Claxton, her exact words during the hearing were, quote, you know, free to argue down the line if something comes up in discovery that indicates some, you know, real need to go back further, end quote.

And the very next sentence she followed that up with, but I'm going to stand pat on the January 1st, 2015, time frame.

It certainly did not include a reference to being able to seek an expanded time period just for

good cause, as is stated in plaintiff's proposed order. And she also — I would also say that, including the additional language, and Judge Claxton's comments, I would say that was akin to last Friday when we were before you and the order granting plaintiff's joint motion to facilitate coordination of depositions and related actions.

As you recall, the plaintiff sought up to 11 hours in deposition time, which was granted. And you advised on the record — and I'm just paraphrasing, not to quote — that if it were to come up that that extended time period is being abused or, you know, being — parties are being asked unnecessarily duplicative questions, then defendants could seek relief from the Court.

You know, that didn't need to be, that didn't need to be put in the order. And I just think this is similar. And the fact that plaintiffs can seek relief from the Court if they have some very real need to go back further that comes up in discovery, they know how to do that without that having to be expressly written into an order.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess the difference then is simply something that, I suppose, any party could re-raise with the Court, if there is

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additional information that comes to light that is a basis and is material for the Court to consider in reevaluating, reconsidering a prior ruling. I suppose that's always an option, regardless of what the language of the order says.

But it seems like from reviewing the transcript with Judge Claxton, that that was the time frame that she had in mind. And it also sounds pretty consistent with what -- sorry. I'm getting some -- Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner. Hello. Okay. Thank you.

But perhaps it looks like, given what

Judge Claxton had previously ruled, that it would be, the

defense version on that would be consistent. As with

anything, I suppose, if there is additional information

comes to light, and there is a basis for the Court to

reevaluate, then I suppose that's always an option

anyway.

What about the other differences here?

MR. GAFFNEY: The only other difference,
we actually resolved. And it was — the only material
difference was plaintiff's version had said that
production pursuit to that order shall be substantially
completed not later than 30 days from entry of the order.
And the version that Mr. Webb proposed, that we proposed
on behalf of Mr. Webb, said 45 days. And the parties

have agreed on the 45 days.

THE COURT: Okay. What about this, at least 14 day prior to deposition, that was in the plaintiff's version. Is that in here?

Plaintiff version says 30 days prior to order, and at least 14 days before deposition for Mr. Webb.

MR. GAFFNEY: In all reality, based on scheduling, I don't know that Mr. Webb's deposition would be taking place within 45 days, in any event. So I don't know that that langue matters to plaintiffs, unless they say otherwise.

THE COURT: Ms. Schwarz.

MS. SCHWARZ: Well, the language matters to us. Depends on when the — let me say this. If it's a rolling production and we don't have all the documents, and we have a beginning of documents 45 days from now, but not a conclusion of it, that's the only time I can see that would become an issue, is if the whole production couldn't be done in 45 days.

I don't know that to be the case. I just think — that's the issue, is we want to have a cut off, so that if we're getting ready for depositions, it's not, well, we provided some, but we get dumped with majority of it later down the road.

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MR. GAFFNEY: It will be substantially complete in 45 days pursuant to the order, so it wouldn't -- there wouldn't be a dump within 14 days of the, of the deposition. THE COURT: I quess theoretically if there are documents produced three days before his deposition, that's a concern, even if it's a smaller amount. Yeah. Then I certainly appreciate the parties trying to cut off any problems down the road, but I'm not sure this one -- what to do. It seems to me here the defendant's version is pretty straight forward. I quess, of course, if it's produced two or three days beforehand, and it's 100 documents, versus 50, you could reschedule the deposition, which the parties would not be very happy with, I image, with Mr. Gaffney producing it when everyone is trying to coordinate these things. So I assume that's not going to be a problem. Anyone else wish to be heard about these competing versions before we move on? Okay. MS. SCHWARZ: Not from the plaintiffs, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. MR. GAFFNEY: Not from --THE COURT: I'll enter the defense

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versions then that was submitted. And we'll get that docketed today. So let's see what is next on my list. Well, I guess, the next one is the Charlesbank and Bain parties. I did get your email raising the, 7 addressing the disputes. And it appears that the Bain and Charlesbank defendants' position, in light of what occurred before Judge Claxton, and their review of Judge Lipman's order, feel that discovery should not proceed as to those defendants until the Court rules on the motion to dismiss as to them. 12 Is that where you all are at on that? MR. KAISER: That is definitely were Charlesbank and Bain are. And as you pointed out, that's where Judge Claxton was. 17 Okay. Plaintiffs. THE COURT: MS. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, we -- yes, that was where Judge Claxton was. I would like to preface with, she

didn't -- at the hearing, it was three weeks ago, and the order had just come down in the American Spirit case. And she didn't hear any argument or any -- didn't open it up for even do we agree -- obviously, we don't agree that the motion to dismiss is going come out the same way when

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you have different counsel, different complaints.

Her presumption was that our complaints were identical, and our complaints were identical, and that's not correct. And so I would just like the Court to know that there was no discussion, no argument. It was not a ruling that we weren't going to, she just deferred it, saying, I think it's coming soon, so I'm going to put it off to see if it happens. That was over three weeks ago.

Obviously, their position hasn't changed, that there is no negotiations, there is no productions that are going to happen.

For us the issue is, again, it's been three weeks and we haven't seen an order from the Judge. We don't know when that's coming. Depositions are going on where Charlesbank and Bain are referenced and discussed, and we are hamstrung with having no discovery.

We have 12 documents, insurance policies, but no documents.

So, for example, a deposition occurred this week where both the Varsity people were asked about Charlesbank and Bain in their interactions with them and what they said. And there was testimony, yeah, Bain did significant due diligence long in advance of the — and I'm paraphrasing, obviously — long in advance of the

purchase.

And we had nothing, because we don't have any documents that we can even look to to begin our discovery. So we're getting hamstring with the other defendant depositions.

So it's impacting more than just our ability to prosecute the case against these two defendants, it's hurting our ability across the board.

So I would argue that, one, Judge Lipman very clearly stated that Fusion and our case are different. They have different classes. They have different claims. They're not overlapping. They may be competing. And that discovery would not be stayed during the motion to dismiss Practice.

So we would appreciate if the Court could hear argument today, so that we can move forward with discovery for our case across the board.

THE COURT: Okay. Response.

MR. KAISER: Yes, Your Honor.

First of all, Judge Lipman — Judge Claxton did not say anything about the ruling from Judge Lipman coming down soon. So that's not what she based her decision on.

I would also preface this by saying that if we're going to -- every time the plaintiffs don't like

something that you or Judge Claxton says, we're going to reargue it three weeks hence. That's not conducive to getting this case done.

Judge Lipman has put us on a very, on a schedule. And she's made it clear that she wants to move forward, not constantly revisit things.

What Judge Claxton did say, which is totally correct, is that there are pending motions to dismiss Bain and Charlesbank. The arguments are exactly the same. They are based on complaints with pretty much the exact same foundation, which is true.

The distinctions that Ms. Schwarz raised are not really distinctions. Yes, they're different employers, that's true. But that's not the point.

The point is that Bain and Charlesbank are the owners, or (inaudible) were the owners of Varsity.

And there is nothing in the complaint to justify holding them liable for whatever Varsity is said to have done.

So that's the same issue in both of them. We would all like to get these motions to dismiss resolved, of course.

Judge Lipman has done a great job in all respects, but it takes time to get through these things. And I expect she will probably rule on these pretty soon. But then again, I don't really know.

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As you know this issues of being hamstrung or whatever, that's really inaccurate. The fact is that the parties, Varsity and the U.S.A., the parties that actually were involved in cheerleading have produced an inordinate amount of materials, including all sorts of materials that were given to Bain and Charlesbank as the owners.

In addition, there are multiple, probably more than 10 third parties who have produced thousands and thousands, and tens of thousands of documents regarding the purchase of Bain — purchase of Varsity by Bain, by Charlesbank, due diligence materials. I mean, more than you could spend the rest of your life using, going through, et cetera.

So the idea that they don't have this stuff is just factually incorrect.

What we're talking about now is digging into two guys' files and the emails of two guys, Bain and Charlesbank, that are probably, almost surely going to be out of this case, based on what happened with the American Spirit case, and they should not be subject to party discovery. It's just that simple.

That's what Judge Claxton ruled. And I would submit to this Court that's what the final outcome here should be.

And it's just unfair to us to constantly have to come back and argue these same things over and over again, deal with the same things over and over again.

Plaintiffs did not ask Judge Claxton for time — they accepted the ruling and moved on. I think, frankly, when the magistrate change happened, they saw an opportunity to maybe get a second shot at this and now here we are.

But I don't think you should give them a second shot at this. I think we should be done with this until the motion to dismiss is decided.

THE COURT: Well, there is no motion to stay discovery as to Charlesbank and Bain, Correct?

Judge Claxton had decided that without a motion?

MS. SCHWARZ: Correct.

MR. KAISER: She decided to set the motion to compel aside pending the motion to dismiss decision by Judge Lipman, that's correct.

THE COURT: Right. So effectively staying discovery as to Charlesbank and Bain. But there was — just reviewing the docket, there was no motion to stay the discovery as to those, pending the resolution of motion to dismiss.

MR. KAISER: Correct.

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THE COURT: All right.

So a few things here. First, is that — and, perhaps, the judges can differ. But at least for me, normally I would require the parties to brief a motion to stay discovery, and even in the situation where it is just a part of the case, so that the Court can give both sides advance notice that I'm considering it and an to opportunity to be heard.

Because in this case, if Bain and Charlesbank, there is no discovery as to them, and if Judge Lipman — and I know defense disagrees — but if Judge Lipman decides to not grant the motion, and discovery then is to proceed against them, with everyone else that's been on board, and having engaged in discovery, will — what would Bain and Charlesbank defendants say at that point?

Are they going to ask for a redo for discovery? Or are they going to accept the discovery that has been conducted, depositions, and utilize it, and even if they haven't said — an opportunity to question witnesses and participate in meaningful over the next whatever it is days, weeks, months, until —

MR. KAISER: Bain and Charlesbank will not use that set of circumstances as a reason to redo any discovery. I can assure the Court of that.

In terms of a motion to stay discovery, if the Court would prefer we file such a motion and brief that, that would be perfectly fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SCHWARZ: Obviously, Your Honor, there wasn't a motion to stay. And this was not some gotcha act by us. We had asked for this hearing. And the change of Magistrate Judge didn't change anything, other than you put — you put them back on calendar. And to us, that meant we were entitled to raise our position with you.

If they get to now file a motion to stay, it's going to be on the same basis that we just heard here without, again without — I can give you our position on it. But, again, it's just going to delay it.

And we have got depositions. And, frankly, his position that we have the evidence because other third parties produced documents, you know, we want it from the defendants we sued. We don't want to go through the files of people we didn't sue to see what they have to say about the people we did sue.

And they are, in our view, in our case,
Charlesbank and Bain are relevant because we allege that
their acquisitions involve valuation of Varsity. It
involved the markets. It involved the competition. And

whether or not they're parties, they have relevant evidence that, just like in other cases, we'll serve third party subpoenas and have to get it that way, should the motion be ruled on.

So this is just a — to me it's a kicking the can down the road. How much longer can be extend this without having to participate? Without having to even participate in meeting and conferring about — let's say we win and the Judge does deny the motion.

What could we agree to? What could we say this is what we're going to go forward with, should that occur? That doesn't require hundreds of thousands of dollars, as they posit, in discovery. But I just — it's very hard to say, sure, let's now brief a motion to stay, when we've been fighting about this for months and months and months, and we have nothing to just say, sure, we'll go with a couple more months of briefing to see whether or not we can push a discussion forward. Because we might, we might win, and we might lose, but that's how this works. And the Judge don't stay discovery simply because one side thinks that they're certainly right.

MR. KAISER: We would be happy to talk to them about what happens if the motion to dismiss is denied, that — that's the first time that's been proposed.

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To clarify on what I was talking about, what else has been produced. What has been produced is exactly what she says they want, which is the due diligence materials. That has produced by other parties had access to them, as I understand it.

And so, yes, there is no — that's not really, you know, the issue. If they don't want to go through things that have been produced, that's up to them, I supposed.

The other thing is, Fusion Elite, the other case, did issue a subpoena to us, to Bain and to Charlesbank. That subpoena was complied with many months ago. They have all the documents that were produced in response to those subpoenas.

So, you know, I don't know. This is, obviously, more, a lot more stuff. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional expense. And, you know, that's party discovery. And we just don't — given where things stand with Judge Lipman on the motion to dismiss, again, we don't think that's appropriate at this time.

We also don't think it's appropriate on the merits, for many reasons we could — we got into in the motion — in the motion to compel briefing. But at the threshold, we don't think this should be something that gets resolved right now because of that.

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But in terms of talking to plaintiffs about alternative possibilities if the motion to dismiss is denied, we would be all, certainly in favor of doing that.

is, thinking through the different scenarios. Even if the motion to dismiss were granted against Charlesbank and Bain, that wouldn't foreclose the plaintiff to obtain third party discovery through subpoena from your clients. Would they be entitled to the exact same information that they're asking for through the discovery request here? Would it be a narrower set?

MR. KAISER: I don't think so, Your Honor, because what they're asking for here is so beyond what any third party would ever be compelled to produce in a, under a Rule 45 subpoena. I don't think it's really — well, it's completely inappropriate under the Federal rules as they pertain to parties as well, but it's over the top inappropriate when it comes to a third party.

And, again, they have been subject to third party subpoenas by Fusion Elite, which, frankly, sought a lot of the same kinds of things they're asking for. You know, a certain portion of that was produced and that resolved it with Fusion Elite. So that has kind of already played out.

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Now they may say, we can issue our own subpoenas. And I suppose they could. I would remind the Court, again, that the Judge, Judge Lipman has ordered these guys to coordinate on discovery. And I guess this would just be another example where they chose not to. But, you know, that could be what happens here.

And if it does, it does, but we would have to take those issues up as they come.

THE COURT: I'll let Ms. Schwarz respond. Sounds like she wants to respond to some of your comments.

But ultimately here we're are we if -- I'm not suggesting that a motion to stay is required; although, I think, quite frankly, it probably would make sense for the record.

But insofar as the outcome, if the Court agrees with Charlesbank and Bain's position that discovery should be stayed in light of the pending dispositive motion in the Jones case, coupled with Judge Lipman's opinion in the American Spirit case, that it would, from your position, would apply equally to this case and the complaint, that wouldn't necessarily prevent the Jones plaintiff from issuing the Rule 45 subpoenas and getting some information from those defendants that they might argue would be relevant to this, to the Jones

litigation.

And if that were the case, would it be — and it sounds like, and I wasn't aware of this, is that with Fusion Elite, that — Mr. Kaiser, your comment was that their subpoena sought largely the same type of information that the party discovery that Jones has served upon your clients in this case is seeking.

And if that's the case, and if the discovery was produced in the Fusion Elite case, and if that's going to overlap with what Ms. Schwarz had sent to you for the party discovery, then maybe the issues in dispute is much much narrower than what has been set forth in the emails to my chambers.

MS. SCHWARZ: Your Honor, if I could, obviously, respond to that. We disagree. I'm not one to assume intent by anyone else, so I prefer to just let you know that in the Fusion litigation, obviously, Charlesbank and Bain are not defendants.

What is sought from them in those litigations is not what we are seeking in our request for production of documents in this case.

Second, in Fusion they produced 13 documents and 19 documents, respectively. That's it.

That's, that is so wholly insufficient and is not related to what we are requesting here.

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And I think it would be inappropriate for us to have to argue why we should get documents through a third party subpoena right now, when we don't have the benefit of briefing that for Your Honor, to provide you with the law of what is appropriate and is not appropriate, and what would be included in a Rule 45 subpoena.

You know, we intentionally crafted our request to not repeat what was done in Fusion. We aren't seeking what was done in Fusion. There were no custodial searches done in Fusion. We weren't involved — in fact, their discovery was served before we even had our complaint on file.

So to say, well, gosh, Fusion did this. We didn't have any participation in what Fusion did. Again, it is — it's a different claim. We have them as defendants here. And I don't think that just saying, well, we produced 13 and 19 documents, so you got everything you can possibly need, it's just not, it's not reality.

So I would argue that, Your Honor, this is not something where we can just all sit aside and say, gosh, go look at everyone's else's documents until a ruling comes down. We would like to have guidance from the Court so that the parties can get started. That if

the motion goes our way, that we have guidance from the Court on what that time period is going to look like, what those custodians are going to look like, what the — which files are going to be searched.

I think these are not issues pertaining to particularly requests, so much as a broader issue of what, what this is going to look like.

So while I raise the idea that we need to talk about this, we've been asking to talk about this. I would say not me personally, so Mr. Kaiser doesn't need to say, well, I wasn't involved, because it wasn't me personally over the summer. But our firms have been communicating about, well, what about these custodians, what about this?

And we have been saying all along, you know, where can we come to an agreement on something?

And the response is just, no. We'll give you one custodian --

MR. KAISER: Your Honor --

MS. SCHWARZ: -- we'll give you a two year period.

So I think it would not do us well to just walk away from this and say, file a motion to stay, and then maybe you guys chat, because we're not going to get anywhere. The position is going to be, we're just going

to keep pulling this out until a ruling on the motion has been handed down.

MR. KAISER: Your Honor, I'm sure the last thing you want on a Friday afternoon is to -- refer discussions. But it is true that Ms. Schwarz was not involved in those.

The fact is that that the position that the plaintiffs put out months and months ago in terms of everything she just talked about, despite many hours of conversations with them, has never moved one inch.

No matter what we say, no matter what we offer, no matter what we try, it's always been the day-one position. There has been no negotiating with these folks.

Yes, they get on the phone. But when you try to talk to them, nothing. We tried to reach an accommodation with them. They rejected it. They want 17 custodians from these two clients.

Let's put that in prospective. In the Varsity defendants, the Varsity defendants, the people that actually ran this business that they say, is really what this case is about, the total number of custodians is 20. And yet they want 17 from these two, you know, people who just owned the company during various periods.

So, yes, nothing -- we have not been able

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to reach an kind of conclusion with them, because they refuse to even consider the fact that they're asking for way too many custodians, asking for every document about Varsity. So many problems that are weighted out in the motion to compel.

So I really — I know judges hate hearing about this kind of stuff, she said, he said, whatever. But since it was bought up, I felt I had to, compelled to respond.

They have not moved from their position one iota as far as I can see in months and months.

So here are some THE COURT: Okay. thoughts. It would seem just initially that, that what Judge Claxton had -- whether you call it a ruling or thoughts on the pending motion to dismiss and it's impact in discovery in this case, I would tend to agree with. It would appear that the pending motion before Judge Lipman on the Jones case that relates to Bain and Charlesbank, the analysis, would -- again, without briefing from the parties, and that's why I raised it, would appear to have, as Judge Claxton commented, not exactly her words, but that it would appear to be applicable in this case. But again, subject to being convinced otherwise by the parties through appropriate briefing on an issue that I do think is important.

Because ultimately, if the Court were to agree with the defendants and say, okay, what Judge Claxton says is, appears to be correct, and I would agree with it, but, ultimately, it wouldn't prevent plaintiffs any way to — if there was a stay, it wouldn't be a stay as to complete discovery for Charlesbank and Bain, but rather to party discovery, I suppose. In which case they could then issue subpoenas and proceed that way.

So are we just kicking the can down the road to where it would be a month from now, which is these same are before the Court in the form of third party subpoenas?

And, Mr. Kaiser, you've argued that, well, it would be over, overbroad and expansive to allow plaintiffs to take third party discovery against your clients in a case where — and let's assume for a moment they are dismissed. I don't know. I suppose we can address that at the appropriate time.

But in that situation, maybe you're right, that there would be a narrower set of documents that plaintiffs would be entitled to as non-parties.

But then what happens is that later on, if it turns out that your client ends up being back in the case, or in the case without being dismissed at all, then what? The discovery bus has left. Everyone has been

involved. And I suppose the plaintiffs would then be allowed to take party discovery from your client. And your client would not have participated up to that point, and, I suppose, run the risk of foregoing opportunities to attend depositions and to participate.

But it sounds like you're okay with that.

MR. KAISER: Indeed.

THE COURT: What was that?

MR. KAISER: Indeed. Yes, we don't have any concerns on that front.

THE COURT: So will it be then the plaintiffs playing a bit of catch up, get initial documents that may be they would be entitled to from party discovery, as opposed to third party discovery?

And what I don't know is the difference between the two in this case, and if there is any difference. And if there isn't much of a difference, then we're back to square one; which is, that while there is a stay, there really isn't a stay.

And with everyone else engaging in discovery, does it just make sense to go ahead and file forward with discovery against your clients, even though you've got a good argument that there is similar issues here, at least to your client, and the applicability of Judge Lipman's orders.

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MR. KAISER: Well, I would just say in response to all that, which is all points well taken. Is that if it comes to pass that Bain and Charlesbank are — you know, the motions to dismiss go the plaintiffs way, yes, that will have to be addressed and we will — and it will be.

And if that requires a little bit more time for them to finish up discovery of Bain and Charlesbank, you know, that's the risk we would be running, absolutely. And we are more than willing to run that risk. Because the alternative is right now spending, as everyone agrees, I mean Ms. Schwarz said this before, hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars, you know, beating through nine — sorry, 17 custodian documents, which is what we did in the entire Varsity case, more or also, the Varsity people, and spending — I say hundreds and hundreds, but it's really a hundred thousand per at least, so we're talking millions now, that may ultimately and probably will ultimately prove to be unnecessary.

And we're not — we come back to the point that these are not the operating parties. These are people who own the operating parties. Now they have their theories about how to get them into the case. And that's fine. That's before Judge Lipman.

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But at the end of the day, it certainly does not call for anything remotely — whether it's a non party discovery or subpoena, it doesn't — but even more so if it's a subpoena — doesn't call for anything like what they're asking for.

So I would say that we run the risk. If things don't go our way in the motion to dismiss, we'll have to come back and deal with this down the road. I don't think that's kicking the can down the road, so much as preserving Bane and Charlesbank's rights, and making sure that we don't end up in a situation where we're spending millions of dollars on discovery that never should been taken in the first place.

THE COURT: Well, sounds like you agree, Mr. Kaiser, that regardless, that the discovery is not going to be stayed completely against your client. That there needs to be some discovery that your clients, even in a third party context?

MR. KAISER: Well, Bain and Charlesbank, were subject to subpoena in Fusion Elite and did produce documents. What they agreed to produce were presentations that Varsity made or received from Bain and Charlesbank that the third parties made. To us that fills the bill.

Now there are a lot of other documents

that have been produced by Varsity or by third parties that also, you know, fall into the categories of things that Bain saw or whatnot and due diligence and all the issues that Ms. Schwarz referenced.

So they have — I think what has already been produced pretty much covers the water front on what would be legitimate, frankly, either in party or in subpoena. But if there is something in a Rule 45 context that they think, you know, they haven't gotten, you know, we can talk to them about that. That's fine.

But I don't know see any cause — in a party situation and these facts, or, frankly, even more so in a subpoena situation, to do this kind of massive ESI, expansive emails and all that kind of discovery, like they put forward in the motion to compel.

So I think it's a qualified, yes, to your question, but definitely a qualified yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Ms. Schwarz.

MS. SCHWARZ: I hesitate, because I don't think this is the appropriate place to argue the motion to dismiss.

But what he keeps saying is, they're not parties to this, and they're not the real actors. But that's not what we have alleged. You know, our

allegations are that they did. They sit on the board of directors today making the decisions.

When Charlesbank owned Varsity through the indirect parent, they had requirements that if acquisitions were going to be made above a certain dollar threshold, Charlesbank had to sign off on it. They were not a passive investor. They sit on the board. They oversee the conduct. Both companies did that, and do that today.

So to say they are just owners is not true. Again, that's motion to dismiss. That's coming down the road. But I don't want you walking away from this with the view that, oh, gosh, these are just big private equity companies that were kind of tangentially, so why put them through this. Because that is not our allegation.

Our allegations are that they are actors in the conspiracy. They are actors that helped to create this monopoly that is now excluding others from the market.

So I'm not going to repeat everything I said. I think we should have some guidance on what we can anticipate receiving. The motion to dismiss is what it is, but that's not before Your Honor. But, again, I just — I can't sit here and say that these are

absolutely passive investors that have no part in it.

Because while that might have been the allegations in American Spirit, it is not the allegations in our case. And as more evidence is coming out and more is being discovered, we have documents showing that that is to be true. So I don't think that we should be stuck in the place of, well, American Spirit didn't do it, and so that, and Fusion, they're not defendants there, so they didn't ask same documents you asked for, so you should habe to be just stuck with what others did.

MR. KAISER: Well, Your Honor, those are, in fact, exactly the allegations at American Spirit. So I don't know what difference is being referred to, but there is no difference.

THE COURT: Okay. And I think repeated, as said by the parties, that this is not the time or place to have to hash out those arguments and try to resolve that.

I think what needs to happen is that -- well, a couple of options.

First, is the briefing. I hesitate to say that, because it will delay things. But I don't know really it's a motion to stay. I suppose it is. But I think that regardless of what occurs there, it wouldn't be stayed completely. Whether it be through party

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discovery or through subpoena, there would be steps that I think the plaintiffs would be entitled to anyway.

Now maybe the scope is affected there between the two. But I think that there is some amount of discovery that plaintiffs would be entitled to, regardless the outcome of the motion to dismiss.

So how do we -- what's the most efficient way of getting that resolved? One is getting the parties to talk, and then reconvening in a week or so, where parties can inform the Court about any resolution, with the understanding -- I think that reading your emails, that up to now, the defendants have been resisting having -- I should -- but there has not been fruitful discussions because of this issue about this stay that came up with Judge Claxton.

And my view is that, I don't necessarily disagree, but I do think that in the non-party, at a minimum in the non-party context there would be ways in which the plaintiffs would be able to get discovery from the defendants.

Now maybe it isn't the number of custodians. Even in the party context — I'm not ruling one way or the other on this, but even in the party context, perhaps that could be scaled back, regardless of where Bain and Charlesbank end up in this case, if at

all.

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But maybe there needs to be meaningful discussions of scaling that back, and the scope of that, that ESI discovery.

So those are my thoughts. I don't think a complete stay, regardless of what the outcome of the motion to dismiss, would be appropriate.

MR. KAISER: As I said, we're certainly happy to talk to the plaintiffs. So far they've never moved off their original position, but maybe that will change with this guidance. And perhaps some sort of accommodation can be made.

THE COURT: Okay. So not to take up the time of everyone else, I want to be respectful of their time, what I'd like to do then is — I know next week is a holiday week. But to come back maybe early part of the following week with those parties who are interested — and everyone is invited back. You will all get the invitation, but you don't have to appear if you don't want to.

But for those who have something to say, and wish to be heard on this, you are welcome to join. But we will send out another notice.

My expectation is that there would be some type of meaningful discussion between the parties. As I

said, the email was sort of here's what we want. And the other side is not talking to us because they think the case will be stayed. Here's what we want. That was sort of the whole thing all the way down the email.

So it wasn't really too helpful to me. Obviously, not that helpful for the parties.

MR. KAISER: Can I make one personal request that that next hearing be the end of next, the week after next, because we are heading into the holidays and — my bigger problem is the clients and forth that. Also, this case has been moving at a very high rate of speed, and we — I personally would prefer not to spend the Thanksgiving weekend talking about this with the plaintiffs. I suspect the plaintiffs may feel the same way; although, they might not want to say it.

THE COURT: Are you asking for a resetting for the end of, end of the following week?

MR. KAISER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Right. So I said Monday or Tuesday of the week after Thanksgiving, but you're asking for the following, end of that week.

MR. KAISER: Well, you know, that wouldn't be great for me either. If it's going to involve me, I really — it would be much better if it was Monday or Tuesday of the following week, so whenever that is, the

1 first full week of December. 2 THE COURT: Right. That's what -- right. 3 So that's Monday the 29th. MR. KAISER: No. I would say one week 4 5 hence, so whatever that is. Sixth of December, or 6 whatever. 7 THE COURT: Well, okay. I see. So you're 8 saying two weeks from now? 9 MR. KAISER: Yes, sir, that is -- right. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Well, how is that going 11 to impact the, any of the depositions, discovery, and 12 other things that parties are trying to achieve in this 13 and other cases? 14 MS. SCHWARZ: I believe we have 15 depositions that are occurring. I don't know the whole 16 deposition schedule, but I know that I'm taking 17 depositions that week and the following week, I believe, 18 and the week of Christmas, for that matter. 19 THE COURT: You said that week. You mean 20 next week? 21 MS. SCHWARZ: Ronnie, you may have to 22 chime in, because I don't have that calendar. But I 23 think it's the week of the 6th and the week of the 20th, 24 I know I have depositions. 25 MS. SPIEGEL: We're able to cover

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something I think in the first week of December. We do -- defendants are deposing one of our main plaintiffs on December 1st.

I'm Ronnie Spiegel from the Joseph Saveri Law Firm on behalf of the Jones plaintiffs.

So I know we have the deposition on December 1st, Your Honor. So I would just respectfully ask that it be set after that, some time either the 2nd or 3rd, or perhaps in that first week of December, the week of the 6th is fine with us as well.

MS. SCHWARZ: 6th or 7th work for you, Mr, Kaiser. Correct?

MR. KAISER: Yes, that would be my preference. Thank you.

MS. SCHWARZ: Okay. And I don't want to be here and then not show up the next time. I'm going to have to move some things around to make the 6th or 7th work. So if you don't see me, it's not that I just bounced. I just may not be able to get out of some other commitments I've got. But I am sure someone else can step in.

THE COURT: Okay. So how about the 6th, December 6th, Monday. That gives you two weeks to have more meaningful discussions regarding the scope of the discovery here.

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I floated the idea of the motion to stay. I suppose I don't want to end this hearing without at least hearing from the parties about whether they want to file -- well, I guess, it would be defendant wanting to file that, to make a record of it. But as I already indicated, even if I granted, some form of discovery I think would still have to go forward with it. So make use of your time, but I don't want to --MR. KAISER: Your Honor, I prefer to resolve things, rather than stand on ceremony. So, you know, I hear what Your Honor is saying. And, you know -so I think we're -- obviously, I represent clients who may have a different view. But from where I sit know, I wouldn't anticipate the desire to do that. If something changes, I quess we'll just file and it will be what it is. But I think right now, hoping for -- trying to get something on the 6th would be the most productive path forward. THE COURT: Okay. So the 6th. And I

THE COURT: Okay. So the 6th. And I think some of y'all are West Coast, that's why I set it for the afternoon. So we can set it for late morning, Terry, or 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

THE CLERK: We can do that, Judge.

THE COURT: 1:30, set it for that.

1 THE CLERK: Yes, sir. 2 That will be Central Time, THE COURT: 3 1:30, Monday 6th, for video hearing. 4 And prior to that I would require the 5 party to meet and confer, to attempt to resolve the 6 disagreement, and then to provide me by that Friday just 7 a written update. It doesn't have to be anything fancy, 8 but just a written update about whether everything is 9 still on the table or whether y'all have it resolved. 10 And maybe I'll get good news and that y'all resolved 11 everything. 12 So let's do that by the 3rd then, close of 13 business on the 3rd. So just let me know. That will let 14 me know how to spend the weekend before the 6th. Okay. 15 Then if there is no resolution, or not 16 complete resolution, then I will take the issues up one 17 by one, and we'll resolve any disputes on the 6th 18 regarding the scope of discovery and how to move forward 19 from here. 20 Then as mentioned, on Monday, if the other 21 Varsity, that motion, just let me know -- just let me 22 know what y'all decided. I don't know if they're still 23 on the call. I can see some of them maybe. 2.4 MR. KAISER: We will take no one --25 FEMALE VOICE: We're still here.

1	FEMALE VOICE: We're all still here.
2	THE COURT: So let us know if there is
3	anything I need to do further on that. Okay.
4	Anything else at this time before we
5	adjourn and see those who are interested on the 6th, from
6	the plaintiffs?
7	MS. SCHWARZ: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
8	THE COURT: Defendants?
9	MR. KAISER: No, Your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Okay. All right.
11	MR. GAFFNEY: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
12	THE COURT: Have a good weekend everyone.
13	MS. SCHWARZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
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